

Jan Øberg

MYTER OM Sikkerhed

En kritik af dansk forsvarspolitik
i et udviklingsperspektiv

Myths Of Our Security

A Critical Analysis of Danish Defence
Policy in a Development Perspective

Summary of a Dissertation - Lund 1981



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MYTER OM VOR SIKKERHED

EN KRITIK AF DANSK FORSVARS - POLITIK I ET UDVIKLINGSPERSPEKTIV

av

Jan Øberg

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Myths Of Our Security. A Critical Analysis of Danish
Defence Policy in a Development Perspective

Abstract (with key words)

The problem addressed in this dissertation is this:
What are Danish defence and security policies and
structures all about, and what are the overall trends
for a number of central issues when analysed from a
Danish, a European and a global perspective?
The issues analysed in detail are the changes of
objects of the Danish defence, the concept and orga-
nisation of total defence, official threat percep-
tions, the development in defence budgets, military
research and development, military-industrial pro-
duction, arms imports and export policies and
legislation and public opinion-forming information
policies.

The European-oriented part deals with modern military
doctrines of NATO and the Warsaw Pact pertaining to
warfare in Europe, with contemporary war scenarios
and with problems related to the measurement of
military expenditures and military balances.

The last macro-oriented part analyses world images,
particularly as they are reflected in Danish mass-
media, and outlines some preconditions for developing
a global consciousness. It takes up world system
development trends including the New International
Economic Order and the New International Military
Order as indicators of a long-term decline of the
Western center of the world and of militarism and
intensified maldevelopment. Finally, there is a
'realistic Utopia' of "another security and develop-
ment for another Denmark."

The dissertation is based on a research model inte-
grating empiricism, criticism and constructivism and
falls within the modern tradition of peace and con-
flict research. A variety of analytical methods are
employed and there is a general endeavour to challen-
ge conventional wisdoms or what is termed myths.
Its style of language and overall organisation aims
at academic, but also non-academic target groups.

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1. Prologue

The problem addressed in "Myths..." could be formulated in this manner: What are Danish defence and security structures and policies all about, and what are the overall trends for a number of central issues when analysed from a Danish, a European and a global angle?

If there is one hypothesis that forms the leitmotif of this dissertation, it is the following: The traditional defence and security policy conducted on the basis of the 'power politics' paradigm within the international relations "school" - accompanied by ideas of national security, national interests, predominantly military-territorial defence and ongoing armament-for-security and balance of power reasoning - is approaching its ultimate limits.

These limits are outer limits - having to do with resource consumption, conflict potentials and insecurity of the global system - and inner limits - having to do with human security and development options, democratic order, decision-making capability and militarism. Sooner or later such limits tighten up around small nations, partly through national processes, partly through global armament dynamics.

Thus, there is a crisis perspective in "Myths..." Denmark's security policy increasingly displays an image of cul-de-sac in its theoretical foundation, in its underlying domain assumptions and, consequently, in the field of practical politics. In other words, military developments weigh heavily down on the "carrying capacity" of civilian societies.

It is only natural, therefore, to look for new ideas and concepts which may form a constructive alternative - built, for instance, on a recognition that there are limits to military growth, but not to security understood as the striving for survival of the whole human being and all human beings.

It may readily be asked, what are the indicators that this particular but complex hypothesis holds some validity? An answer would be along these lines: Defence and security policy decisions, as well as overall trends, are increasingly founded on what could be called myths and rituals more than on comprehensive, open-minded and nationally independent analyses.

Likewise, there is a tendency to conceal "real" assumptions, world images, methods of analysis and planning as well as decision-making criteria in the defence establishment vis-a-vis the people at large whose security is, in principle at least, at stake. Furthermore, the whole sector evades independent, critical investigations to an alarming degree for a liberal, democratic society.

The survival of myths and rituals, in spite of often obvious argument, counter-expertise and myth-exposing data - not to speak of competing theories and concepts - over almost the entire spectrum of defence issues should entice the researcher's mind at a more fundamental level of analysis: Is there something wrong deeper down that can explain this state of affairs? "Myths..." is an attempt in that direction.

It has been an endeavour throughout the book to show that myths can be detected and brought into light not only, and not predominantly, by the easy solution of choosing an altogether different value frame of reference, but by utilising paradigms, analyses, reports, statements etc. emanating from the defence establishment itself - in other words, by carrying out an 'inner'-critical analysis.

However, there is clearly also an 'outer'-critical perspective, the more so towards the final parts. Both the choice of subject and methods as well as format of the book presuppose a value commitment and so does criticism.

A small catalogue of such values would look like this:

(1) Peace - which here implies the absence of both direct and structural violence and the presence of something constructive - in the direction of human-oriented, need-satisfying development and non-exploitative, horizontal relationships between human beings and social units, expressed in theories and practicing of self-reliance from individual to collective level and in respect of Nature.

(2) Security - also taking its point of departure in human beings and global structures - not national security thinking - and seen as a basic human need encompassing those activities which secure survival in contrast to violence, well-being in contrast to poverty and misery, freedom in contrast to repression and identity in contrast to alienation. From this it becomes fairly obvious that security needs have to be satisfied by many more means than weapons, and that - basically - security is a matter of society's structure and relations to other societies.

(3) Development - defined not as mechanical, quantitative economic growth, but as human fulfilment along the lines of the need categories mentioned above. Self-reliance - not to be confused with autarchy - with a strong emphasis on human participation and the 'trickling up' of development from below is central.

It does not take much imagination to see that the three are closely related, overlapping and can only be realized as a complex political strategy. They would, of course, be supplemented by other value commitments such as ecological understanding, global humanism in contrast to national interests, a belief in the capacity and right or legitimacy of people to shape their own future and - last but not least - the necessity to develop realistic Utopias in order to know what to struggle for - the latter so often neglected or ridiculed in the middle of the present Dystopia.

2. Myths of our security

"Myths..." is composed into four main sections - Myths (ch. 1 - 3), Denmark (ch. 4 - 11), Europe (ch. 12 - 15) and, finally, The World (ch. 16 - 18) - of which the second section on Denmark is the largest.

2.1 Myths

This section serves as a short introduction to the general problematic and as a reader's guide.

Chapter 1 deals with the present world crisis and the concept of myth. Three important spheres of social action in Western societies: economics, politics and defence correspond to the complexes of development, peace and security. By analysing them and their implicit and explicit mythology, we should be able to say something relevant about Western society in general and the present crisis in particular.

By means of a few empirical data it is shown that "development" is a complex structure dividing the world into over- and underdevelopment leading to maldevelopment; that "peace" politics has neither eradicated direct nor structural violence, and that "security" has served for quite some time as a euphemism for national interests and resulted in both insecure human beings and a fundamentally insecure world system.

The term 'myths' is not used for strictly scientific test purposes, but it refers to the anthropological definition - as a charter or social document outlining the rules for those in power, serving the double function of explanation and legitimation of the existing order of things and presented to people at large as a system built upon moral, justice and law.

The most important myths are, of course, such that

promote and confirm the status of certain powerful groups, contribute to their maintaining of positions and communicate the idea to the multitudes that things could not have been much different from what they were and cannot - for "natural" reasons - be much different in the future from what they are today, e.g. that there are really no alternatives to ongoing world armament, increasing global disparities, violent methods of conflict resolution and the like. This is how the road to Dystopia is paved with myths of the 'best of all possible worlds.'

In crisis both the seeds of the destructive and the constructive are born. The contemporary security myths which this dissertation primarily deals with are likely to lead to the former while an intellectual and political emancipation from them is one precondition for reaching the latter.

Facing Mankind's bleak predicament it is easy for the individual to be seized with fear and defeatism and become a "doomster". It bears repeating that this is no solution. Chapter 2, therefore, offers some examples with special reference to the increasing influence in Denmark of grass-roots movements in general and the peace and disarmament movement in particular. It is worth while to protest against armamentism and maldevelopment, and struggle for constructive, viable alternatives - practicing the 'philosophy of hope' advocated so convincingly by Jean-Paul Sartre just before his death.

Based on the research model developed by Johan Galtung in which research is the interaction between data and theory (empiricism), data and values (criticism) and theory and values (constructivism), combined into meaningful social action by the researcher, it is argued that the way in which research results are received by central decision-making groups and authorities in itself is an indicator of that society's true openness, liberality and democratic qualities.

Writing "Myths..." has, in this respect, been an interesting social experiment and experience. The author was met with extreme closedness on many occasions which

points in the direction that Denmark, contrary to her common self-perception and in comparison even with other members of the NATO alliance, is a rather closed society as regards defence and security affairs.

Chapter 3 argues in favour of a less elite-oriented social role of research, especially within the field of security analysis. It is a plea for more independent and open-minded research as a vital precondition for modern defence - the more so since security and defence issues are integral parts of that Western democracy which national security policy, including the alliance, is publicly supposed to support.

2.2 Denmark

Chapter 4 brings into focus the formal object of Danish defence and investigates how its stated objects clauses have undergone fundamental changes since 1945 and Denmark's entry into NATO four years later. It is shown how the country's deep structures of defence and overall security perceptions have been moulded by the alliance during the period of ever increasing integration and harmonization - both militarily, economically and politically.

The catchword employed to encircle this development is passive adaptation instead of active adaptation. Leaning on e.g. Rosenauian adaptation theory which is also the prevailing paradigm in the Danish foreign and security policy research milieu, it seems that the security establishment as well as the state bureaucracy at large has forfeited most opportunities - also as an alliance member - to exert proper influence within the alliance but also, perhaps especially, outside it.

It is beyond doubt that this long-term development conflicts with the highest goal - to maintain

as much freedom of action in peacetime as well as war-time as possible. Present plans and preparations for fast reinforcements especially from the United States is one case in point.

One of the most cherished security policy analyses, the Seidenfaden Report, is criticized for its status quo-orientation and 'power politics' paradigm under the pretence of being an objective, versatile basis for decision-makers. Its standards and criteria for evaluating status quo continuation and possible changes - alternatives outside the alliance, non-military defence forms or disarmament initiatives - are not identical.

Chapter 5 deals with the Danish total defence, its organization, main components, their interrelations, problems of priorities and status in terms of resource allocations and shortcomings.

The main components are: 1) the military defence which consists in the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as the Home Guard integrated in NATO's structure through the Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP) which covers the whole of Danish defence, the West-German Navy and Naval Air Arm together with the West-German army and air force units stationed in Schleswig-Holstein, 2) the Civil Defence (C.D.) which is organized nationally as well as under NATO, 3) the Civil Preparedness (C.P.) which is organized in the administrative, the economic, the mass media and the public hygiene preparedness - again on national as well as alliance levels - and 4) the Danish police forces.

The focus is on the C.D. and C.P., and it is concluded that, except for a few areas of activities, these defence components display a surprising number of deficiencies in vital fields such as protective measures for the population, air-raid shelter capacity, chemical and radioactive protection, manpower training etc. - not to mention the preparedness in terms of food, industrial planning, securing and storing of strategic materials, and communication.

As a matter of fact it is pointed out that it is a myth that Denmark actually has a reliable, credible total defence. Ministries endowed with the responsibilities of carrying out legal provisions of the C.D. and C.P. components of total defence were found to have done virtually nothing. Similar circumstances, if found within the purely military defence, would raise an outcry. However, it is only indicative that Denmark does not have a total defence objects clause, that total defence as a concept has never been the object of a broad, integrated government analysis and that defence agreements in Parliament are exclusively about the military component.

In this sense, Denmark's defence and security policies are strongly militarized.

Chapter 6 is a description, analysis and criticism of official threat perceptions and analyses. They usually take their point of departure in Denmark's military-geographical position on the map, the overwhelming military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact (WP), the dominance-oriented Soviet foreign policy and an understanding of the Soviet Union as an unpredictable, unreliable, bureaucratic dictatorship bound for world dominance.

After such perspectives follow scenarios of attack on Denmark, either in isolation or as part of a general thrust to conquer and occupy Western Europe. The threat is reduced to the existence of weapons arsenals on the other side - a reflection also of the fact that the Defence Command and the Defence Intelligence Service are the only manufacturers of threat analyses.

The criticism, brought forward in ten points, centers on the much too narrow threat conceptualization, on the "militarization" of world and enemy images and a number of technicalities in defence forecasting and planning. The myth which this chapter

Kronens regiment



"Regiment of the Crown"

NATO brings pressure to bear on Denmark to boost her defence expenditures:

"May we see a little more fighting spirit, Jørgensen?"

(Bo Bojesen in Politiken in autumn 1980)

seeks to expose is threat analysis is really the guiding principle in overall defence planning and political decision-making. On the contrary it can be argued that it serves to legitimate general trends in world armament, the development of military technology, strategic schemes and alliance policies. In other words, that Denmark has an "ideal" threat perception: The world is so dangerous that defence budgets must be increased continually to 'match' the opponent's forces, but on the other hand the threat is not so overwhelming that military defence is futile!

What is the real costs of Danish defence? This question which is treated in details in chapter 7 has attracted considerable interest because of the NATO decision in principle to increase the military budgets throughout the alliance with 3% annually in real terms.

Following a discussion of the definition problems concerning military expenditures, Denmark's **data are** examined in the period 1949 to 1980 along the following indicators: expenditures in million kroner and current prices, military expenditures as percentage of national GNP, of government expenditures, per capita and, finally, in fixed 1973 dollars.

On all indicators a marked increase - and rate of increase - is documented except on military expenditures as a share of total government expenditures. For instance, from 1949 - 1978, absolute defence expenditures increased 3129% which equals 89% in real terms in the period 1958 - 1978 - or 3,4% per year. It is also shown that Denmark's military matériel investments have risen tremendously.

There is, however, also an international dimension. In absolute figures, Denmark ranks as number 35 among the world's some 160 nations and as number 13 measured in per capita military expenditures. Therefore, the cost analysis is followed by a survey of comparative indicators, i.e. Denmark's position within the alliance, in comparison with Warsaw Pact countries, with a group of neutral countries and with a group of Third World countries.

Generally speaking, it is a die hard myth that Denmark has cut down on defence during the last decades. The image of a feeble military power unable to defend herself and taking a free ride on the alliance is utterly misleading. Besides, Denmark ranks high in comparison with several WP countries and neutral states. And she uses much more than several military regimes, dictatorships, big regional powers and countries placed close to the trouble spots of the globe.

Chapter 8 presents a summary of an investigation of military and military-related research and development (R&D) in Denmark including Greenland. It covers some 20 institutions and types of cooperation, including also foreign-financed military R&D during the last 20 years. Parts of this analysis have been carried out in close cooperation with a number of Nordic peace researchers, first and foremost with Owen Wilkes, SIPRI. Contrary to the general understanding that Denmark carries out almost no military R&D - an impression that is also promoted by examining the Budget - it is shown that, through various channels, Denmark is involved in more military R&D than meets the eye at a first glance. It is also an exemplification of the fact that much useful information which is classified in Denmark is publicly accessible in e.g. the United States.

"Myths..." also explores the Danish military-industrial sector; that is the aim of chapter 9. First, there is a short description of the general arms procurement process in which up to 30 bodies and commissions may be involved. Second, the formal - as well as less formal - relations and contacts between the defence establishment and industrial interests are outlined.

Then follows a survey on company level asking the question: Who manufactures what and with what results? It is based on a questionnaire distributed to some 200 companies, but - since this approach turned out for various reasons to be almost completely futile - the survey is first and foremost the result of meticulously

piecing together a picture from a jigsaw puzzle of literally thousands of bits of information from open sources. This up-to-date register of defence manufacturers presents some 70 companies engaged in defence production and/or trade. From official sources it is estimated that Danish military-industrial production amounts to some 500 million kroner, as its very minimum, per year with an employment effect of 1600 - 2500 jobs. It is shown, furthermore, that the defence establishment's estimate of the employment effect is much too optimistic.

As an extension of this analysis the international military-industrial cooperation between Denmark on the one hand and the United States, NATO and the EEC on the other is briefly described, and a list of 22 NATO coproduction schemes in which she takes part is offered as one indicator of the fact that Denmark is drawn rapidly into military-industrial armament dynamics - even without a stated policy or much national management.

Finally, there is a discussion of the most common arguments to the effect 1) that military investments contributes to civil economic growth in a manner which civil investment cannot possibly do, 2) that they have significant civil spinoffs, and 3) that they create, on a general scale, more jobs than similar civil investments.

On the basis of primarily American research results and a discussion of theoretical principles, it is shown that these three assertions are, by and large, myths and that, therefore, it is highly doubtful whether a small nation like Denmark with a limited defence-industrial capacity should seek to expand this in the direction of a military-industrial complex as seems to be the, rather weak-willed, future perspective of today's developments.

Chapter 10 surveys Denmark's arms import and export and the policies and legislation on which they are based.

It is soon revealed that public statistics in this field cover only a fraction, namely almost exclusively hand weapons and ammunition. Military equipment, helicopters, aircraft, naval vessels except warships, military electronics etc. are items not covered at all. Therefore, total arms trade must be estimated far above the official figures.

The legislation governing this traffic dates back partly to 1937 and the 1960s. It is inadequate vis-a-vis contemporary, highly sophisticated military technology. However, to investigate how the provisions of the legislation are administered, a questionnaire was submitted to the Ministry of Justice, and the chapter reproduces the answers stated and identifies a series of loopholes and ambiguities.

In conclusion, therefore, it is stated that Denmark needs a new restrictive legislation, partly to increase the control of national activities, partly as an effort to dissociate from her increasing involvement in global militarization trends - like e.g. having had Iran as her third largest military customer during the 1970s - but also to show commitment to a credible disarmament policy in the international community.

Now, in relation to many of the issues treated in "Myths..." it is worth asking the question of how is public opinion influenced by the defence establishment? Is it balanced in itself - or is it supplemented by non-defence establishment public information?

Chapter 11 therefore examines the publications coming out of such institutions as the Ministry of Defence, the Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defence, the Defence Command Press and Information Service and a couple of other organizations like the Foreign Policy Society, the Atlantic Association and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The analysis gives at hand that, contrary to the stated purpose of this information policy, it does not represent an objective or balanced image of the issues. There is a lack of problematization, biased

use of statistics and sources - even numerous omissions and errors - there are one-sided world images and selectivity in standards for evaluating "us" vis-a-vis "them." Furthermore, there are several - more sensitive - issues like Denmark's policy concerning nuclear weapons and new reinforcement activities - which are dealt with in an extremely cursory manner, if at all dealt with.

Thus, independent information services are needed, but there are no funds for such alternatives. It can, in summary, only be deplored that Denmark has in no way whatsoever lived up to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSD) resolution of 1978 in which also Denmark committed herself to intensifying public information as to the risks of continuing the armament race.

2.3 Europe

This section of "Myths..." attempts to place Denmark in a European perspective by discussing Europe's role in the East-West power game since 1945 attaching particular importance to the development of military doctrines on both sides. Europe is considered a "hostage" through the doctrine of limited war - limited to European territory and the possible early use of tactical nuclear weapons.

The doctrine of "flexible response" which is NATO's official doctrine today is described. Closely related the idea of deterrence is found which presupposes the capability and willingness to fight a war should deterrence fail, and that again is built on the idea of an escalation ladder and of "rules of the warfare game" being accepted on both sides as gentlemen's agreements.

Of course it is not very likely that a war should be fought on a rational basis - whatever that would mean. NATO maintains the right to be the first

to use nuclear weapons even if faced with a conventional attack from the Warsaw Pact. The risks for small European allies to be victimized under the yoke of super power confrontation under these circumstances are pointed out stressing that the often met assertion among Danish military experts that a war is likely to be kept at the conventional level even for a long time is much too intellectually comfortable.

Soviet strategic thinking is partly a reflection of NATO developments, partly of national historical experience and military-technological development. The main point advanced in this chapter is that although there is an admittedly offensive element in Soviet military thinking, there are numerous other factors to be considered if miscalculations and propaganda are not to take the upper hand. Both alliance systems are seen by their respective members as defensive and by the opponent as offensive - the emphasis on offence and the policy of forward defence, respectively - and both sides cannot but motivate higher levels of armament permanently (both at their own sides and by the opponent) which makes for still lower levels of human security by the European allies in general.

In terms of global capabilities it is pointed out that if it is correct that there is a tendency for the Soviet Union to "imitate" the United States, it is perfectly thinkable that she will try to match this power by global force projections during the 1980s. No matter how this is judged, however, it is no indicator of likely developments in the European theatre.

Chapter 13 goes through a number of topical war scenarios pertaining to Europe, connected with authors like Bidwell, Hackett and Close. They are paralleled to a thirty year old American war plan, 'Dropshot', and the striking continuity stressed. Fourteen critical points are raised - alarmism, political simple-mindedness, self-tormenting presentations of NATO's weakness, militarist thinking, propaganda timing etc.

Military expenditure figures are worth a closer examination, not the least because of the role they play in the general debate and in military balance accounts. Chapter 14 may serve as a guide to some of the admittedly tricky problems and the use and abuse of data and sources.

The discussion first concentrates on the problems of defining military expenditures and, secondly, treats the particular problems of how to measure Soviet military expenditures.

It is shown time and again that the whole area of comparing NATO and WP figures, taking into account the variety of sources available - not to mention their presentation in mass media - is infected by loopholes, biased estimates, outright and unexplained manipulations and changes of methods, base years, exchange rates etc. - to such a degree that it is close to impossible to rely on official statements in one or the other direction. They are used indiscriminately for political purposes - and so too in Denmark. The very least that must be demanded is clear information about the background of published data, i.e. what is measured and what is estimated, what is not measured, what is the source and who is in charge of presenting the data to a wider audience and which political conclusions are they made to support.

Chapter 15 attempts to expose some of the most often employed myths of the military balance in Europe, correcting for mechanical statements making such balance calculations a simple matter of weighing tanks, aircraft, missiles etc. on each side.

The "classical" method of weighing is, of course, to list all the strong point of the opponent (but forget about his weaknesses) and do the opposite for one's own side. This, of course, is the very opposite of what is actually done in war planning!

The most typical weaknesses of NATO are briefly stated and followed by a rather extensive examination of areas and problems in which it can seriously be

doubted that the Warsaw Pact should hold an overwhelming superiority vis-a-vis NATO as is stated by a number of Western sources and, traditionally, the closer one comes to defence establishment circles.

The conventional wisdom is challenged in terms of the Soviet Union's double security challenge, NATO and China - largely ignored by Western accounts - and in terms of features like e.g. the maritime balance, tank, army and air force capabilities, tactical nuclear weapons, level of technology and record of major technological breakthroughs, global intervention capability as well as a number of obstacles to a monumental surprise attack on Western Europe are listed.

It is naturally not an attempt to judge which side is the stronger, neither an effort to show that the Soviet Union is a weak power. The endeavour is to highlight the importance of detailed, balanced and non-propagandistic analyses in carrying out a realistic security policy instead of relying on dangerously 'autistic', alarmist and therefore grossly misleading reports.

2.4 The World

The fourth section presents a macroperspective on security and development and the current crisis, ending up in some constructive thinking on an alternative Denmark.

Chapter 16 serves as a sort of introduction to the next two chapters discussing what is called global consciousness. It is argued that there is only one economic world system, that Centers and Peripheries are intertwined to such an extent that there is no "us" and "them", only a "we". This means caring, in concrete structural terms and not through aid or alms giving, for those victimized by global maldevelopment whether in the periphery or in center countries, i.e. the "global losers".

Thinking globally has to do with world images like, for instance, those presented in Western mass media. Two such broad, generalized world images or models

are examined: a) the journalistic one based more or less directly on the school of International Relations in political science and traditional development economics (an image which is often, in simplified terms, transmitted in Danish mass media) and b) the structural world image or model built around conceptualizations and analyses within such fields as future studies, alternative development research, peace and conflict research etc. The two images are contrasted by illustrating how they "answer" questions such as: What are the basic units of the world system? How are they related to each other? What is development and how is it measured? What are the time and space perspectives? And how do the respective models explain the disparities of the world?

Next, it is asserted that another precondition for developing a global consciousness is to acquire a deeper understanding of that part of the world in which Denmark is situated, i.e. of the Western world or the Occident and 'Westernness' as such.

The macroperspective advanced through these pages is that the Western-based world system as it has developed during the last 400-500 years is on the decline and that the present crisis is part of a deep transition carrying as much significance as that from the Middle Ages to the Modern Period.

Liberal as well as marxist interpretations of the present crisis are considered too narrow and, with an eye on possible future developments, it is rather obvious that both of these paradigms - being Western themselves - are inadequate because they share ideas of materialism, bigness, dominance of Nature, stages in social development almost universally applicable, centers and peripheries as "natural", elite decision-making, vertical relations between man and man and man and woman etc.

It will be increasingly important for Westerners to train ourselves in seeing, learning from and living peacefully with other civilizations,

accepting the idea of many centers and fewer, if any, peripheries - instead of taking the West as the Center, missionary, dominant and blind as it is.

What is challenged is probably some of the basic features of Westernness or Western cosmology as outlined by e.g. Nisbet and Galtung, i.e. a deeper ideology, social grammar and self-understanding of Westerners - concepts of development, the meaning of social and individual life, evolutionary forces, patterns of continuity, perceptions of time and space and attitude to the Biosphere.

During the decline, civilizations usually attempt some kind of rejuvenation, seeking vitality and an extended lifetime. So, too, with the West during the last decades of the 20th century. Two such attempts are identified: The New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the New International Military Order (NIMO) - the one being an explicit treatment, the other implicit.

Both attempts at rejuvenation are presented in the positive - as measures to reach true human and social development and global security. The proper catchwords, however, are further maldevelopment and militarism which reinforces each other strongly risking ultimately the survival of Mankind.

Chapter 17 summarizes this in the following manner: "If armament and civil maldevelopment of global society are so intimately linked to each other as features of direct and structural violence, how could we ever hope to realize goals of disarmament and human security on the one hand and true social development on the other without transforming the structures on which the Western world and its crisis is founded - in other words, without attempting to see security and development as two sides of the same coin called peace?"

Chapter 18 finally presents some visions of peace and alternatives with a clearly stated value commitment, the "credo" of the author ending with a most preliminary draft of "another development and security for another Denmark."

It circles around what is termed the post-violent, peace-making society in which peace and development is, so to speak, built into its structure and aiming at human scaling as well as need satisfaction and increased self-reliance, building a federative world from below, - a world which is expected to be more secure and humane and an expression of global consciousness.

These concluding pages of "Myths..." should stimulate the reader's delight in giving imagination a free rein. It is an argument in itself for the use of 'realistic Utopias' as a precondition for constructive social action - so eloquently expressed by Elise Boulding: "The largest obstacle in the way of disarmament is that human beings can no longer imagine what a disarmed, 'post-military' world would look like. And what people cannot imagine, they are little inclined to fight for."

3. E p i l o g u e

The *raison d'être* of "Myths..." is to present a cohesive, comprehensive, multidimensional image of what Danish defence policy and its crisis is all about, and do so with an empirical-analytical and critical perspective.

"Myths..." represents a pluralist approach both in terms of its overall outline, the variety in themes and analytical methods. Likewise, there is not only one, but more, underlying theoretical paradigms employed - although mostly implicitly.

The issues taken up no doubt wallow in complex theoretical problems of definition, conceptualization and operationalization - think only of security, crisis, threat perception, military-industrial complex, defence economics, military balance accounting,

dependence, underdevelopment, development, self-reliance, basic human need satisfaction, the New International Economic Order, the New International Military Order and peace. Or take the equally difficult empirical problems encountered in analysing military expenditures, military research and development, collecting and systematizing data on military-industrial production and arms exports or calculating the number of victims from both direct and structural violence in the world system.

It would, by all means, be a case of major self-deception should it be maintained that "Myths..." has - could or should - solve such a variety of issues. The endeavour has been to utilise a variety of knowledge 'spaces' like e.g. peace and conflict research, sociology, economics and development research and carry through the entire research process outlined in the introduction, i.e. combining empiricism, criticism and constructivism into possible action for a well-defined better world. In passing it may be said that the constructive part is far the most underdeveloped in "Myths..." and that is correct and will be made up for in a following book entirely devoted to alternatives.

This overall approach ties well in with the fact that "Myths..." is a three-in-one publication: It is a dissertation in sociology specializing in peace and conflict research, it is a source and documention-oriented textbook hopefully to be used in formal education as well as non-formal education in e.g. grassroots movements and, finally, it is written for broad public consumption as a contribution to the discussion of Denmark's security policies in particular and a more peaceful and humane world in general.

Obviously, there are constraints and disadvantages stemming from such an approach and target grouping. However, the author has deemed it desirable to strive for a certain amount of isomorphism - or at least compatibility between content and form. Employing a non-traditional security thinking and a research model aiming at breaking

down high walls between research, politics and citizens' lives, the form and style of language of the book and its way of presenting research results should in themselves reflect a new approach. Hopefully it could also be truly maintained that "Myths..." produces new knowledge and carries out research in fields not researched before in Denmark.

Furthermore, the overall intentions behind the book are reflected in the variety of methods. Chapters range from detailed empirical analyses and source criticism (e.g. on arms production and trade) over rather general discussions of political decision-making and defence economics to - more intuitive and sweeping - views on Westernness and civilizational transition.

There is systematic data collection, interviews, a questionnaire survey, extended literature studies; there is quite some borrowing of research results and theoretical works by other, much more competent research colleagues, and there is highly hypothetical, speculative and non-verifiable discussions of broad development trends of the world system.

Thus, there are several themes, theoretical paradigms, levels of analysis and methods. The author cannot, and does not pretend to, be an expert in all directions. But it remains his obligation to seek an integrated understanding in our complex world. It is a risk - both vis-a-vis the academic community and that of politics - to comfortably limiting ourselves to "empirical dust collection" or splitting world reality in researchable and narrowly limited items missing both the overview, deep structures and, ultimately, relevance. It would be rather Western, too. It would also be tempting to rely on one or two intellectual "schools" and be true to one or another founding father of a theory. However, the world does not operate according such conditions. And it could have been more convenient to hold on to empiricism and criticism to abide by either a positivist or marxist ideal. However much

indebted the author is to both types of reasoning, he willingly runs the risk of being accused of politicizing and lacking objectivity, on the one hand, and of voluntarism and utopianism on the other.

Maybe, after all, the world in the nuclear age cannot wait for us to develop the final answers to these and related academic questions? Maybe, all considered, the questions can wait for their final answers till we have solved the problems of the nuclear age?

Distribution

"Myter om vor sikkerhed. En kritik af dansk forsvarspolitik i et udviklingsperspektiv" (330 pp) 78,- Danish kr.

Mellemfolkeligt Samvirke/
 Danish Association for International Co-Operation
 Hejrevej 38
 DK - 2400 Copenhagen NV

This summary can be ordered from:
 Department of Peace and Conflict Research
 Lund University
 Magle Stora Kyrkogata 12 B
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Also by the author in this field

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February 12, 1981

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Jan Øberg (1951), studies in sociology at Copenhagen University 1971-72; "filosofie kandidatexamen" at Lund University including sociology, economic history and Third World studies 1976. Apart from works on armament and disarmament issues he is the author of "Energi til et bedre samfund" (Energy to a Better Society), Chr. Ejlers' Forlag, Copenhagen 1976, and a contributor of debate and review articles to the Danish daily Politiken. 1977 - 1982 he carries out a research project in the Somali Democratic Republic on "Social Change for Self-Reliance in Somalia". Member of the editorial boards of Journal of Peace Research and Forsvar - Militærkritisk Magasin and of the Danish government's Security and Disarmament Policy Committee.

Notes

Long Ago

ARMS = VICTORY

- war was seemed inevitable
- strong armies could win

In Recent Times

ARMS = SECURITY

- no major war was winnable
- nations armed to deter

Now

ARMS = INSECURITY

- buying arms weakens nations
- arsenals provoke conflict

In the Future

SECURITY = ALTERNATIVES TO ARMS